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V. KERRY SMITH*

Lightning Rods, Dart Boards, and
Contingent Valuation
ABSTRACT
This Article evaluates existing literatureon the performance of
contingent valuation. It considers: the performance of the methods in natural resource damage assessments; the implications of
the Ohio court decision for the use of CVM; the relationship between laboratory experiments on economic valuation and CVM;
and the implications of the NOAA Panel's recommendations.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper was prepared as a companion to the CummingsHarrison's (CH)l evaluation of the use of the contingent valuation
method (CVM) for natural resource damage assessments. Their overview
seeks to stimulate discussion on what we actually know about CVM's
performance. By taking a strong position, often at variance with both
the Ohio court's decision and the positions of CVM practitioners, Cummings and Harrison want to promote some rethinking of entrenched
positions in the CVM debate. Indeed, in early discussions of their research they described the paper's intent as that of a lightning rod for
continued dialogue about CVM. Because lightning rods are intended
to "draw fire," my evaluation focuses primarily on areas of disagreement and offers five primary conclusions:
CH's interpretation of how CVM values should reflect "real eco(1)
nomic commitments" is misleading.
Experimental economics makes its greatest contributions in
(2)
evaluating institutions-the rules governing social interactions.
It cannot claim the same advantages when it ventures outside
the setting of induced preferences, controlled information flows,
and specifically defined incentive structures.
* Arts and Sciences Professor, Departments of Economics and School of the Environment,
Duke University and Resources for the Future University Fellow. Thanks are due Shelby
Gerking for providing the primary data from the Dickie, Fisher, Gerking experiments,
to Glenn Harrison for numerous helpful discussions about the literature on experimental
economics, and to both Glenn and Richard Carson for detailed comments on an earlier
version of this paper, though neither is responsible for any of my errors. Thanks are also
due Carla Skuce for preparing and editing multiple earlier drafts. Partial support for
this research was provided by the University of North Carolina Sea Grant Program Project
No. R/MRD-22.
1. R. Cummings & G. Harrison, Was the Ohio Court Well Informed in Their Assessment
of the Accuracy of the Contingent Valuation Method?, 34 Nat. Res. J. no. 1 (1994).
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Contingent valuation surveys used for natural resource damage assessments do not seek to "create markets" or measure
"market values."
CH's summary of the evidence available to the "Ohio Court"
(4)
about the performance of CVM is somewhat misleading.
Under one restricted definition, nonuse values can be mea(5)
sured from actual expenditures on market goods, but the results should not be treated as inherently more reliable than CVM
estimates.
Section II provides context for the dispute within the evolving
literature on the law and economics of natural resource damage assessments. Section III considers the meaning of CH's "real economic
commitments" as consistency checks for CVM responses. Section IV
raises questions about the relevance of findings from laboratory experiments to CVM. Section V considers an alternative method for measuring nonuse values recently proposed by Larson. 2 Finally, the last
section closes on the same general issues as did CH. Because it was
prepared after their paper and with the benefit of the NOAA panel report on CVM, it is possible to consider both the decision in Ohio and
the panel report in evaluating what we know about CVM.
(3)

II. THE DISPUTE IN CONTEXT
Before turning to CH's thought provoking evaluation of the experimental economics literature and the insights it offers for evaluating the validity of CVM, it is important to provide some context. CVM
has attracted the attention of lawyers in the public and private sectors
because of three interrelated events that are likely to continue to influence federal policy associated with environmental resources.
First, under a variety of legislative mandates a doctrine of natural resource damage liability has evolved as a residual liability for
the damages associated with injuries to natural resources from releases
of hazardous substances or oil,3 The Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980, and the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 have contributed directly to establishing these
concepts.
2. Most analysts who hold this view would argue that the approach advocated by
Larson simply redefines one component of use values to be designated as nonuse or
existence values. See D. Larson, On Measuring Existence Values, has appeared now Land
Economics (Vol. 69, Nov. 1993, 377-88).
3. The concept of natural resource damage liability finds its origin in the Trans Alaska
Pipeline Act in the mid 1970s. For a description of the progressive evolution of this
liability concept see B. Breen, Citizen Suits for Natural Resource Damages: Closing a Gap in

Federal EnvironmentalLaw, 24 Wake Forest L. Rev. 851 (1989).
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Second, implementation of CERCLA has led to challenges to
regulations issued as part of the rule-making process. The most significant of these was State of Ohio v. Dept. of Interior.4 CH highlight
two aspects of this decision: 1) broadening of the types of values to
consider in computing the damages associated with injuries to natural
resources; and 2) the acceptance of CVM as a "best available procedure". Unfortunately, CH omit another aspect of the decision.
The court ruled that, in general, the cost of restoring the injured
natural resource should be the measure of damages. The damages
awarded would differ from the cost of restoration only where such costs
are "grossly disproportionate" in relation to the future losses of use
and nonuse values.5 It seems clear from the legislation and the court
ruling that Congress anticipated that restoration costs would exceed
total value of injuries for many cases. As a result, definitions of economic losses excluding nonuse values will increase the likelihood that
injured resources will not be restored. Because CVM is widely regarded
as the only methodology for measuring total values that include nonuse
values, decisions to allow nonuse,values must address the validity and
reliability of contingent valuation. This additional component of the
court ruling is important. By re-affirming restoration cost as the general measure of damages the Ohio court may have answered CH's closing comment that courts must evaluate the potential for bias in CVM
estimates as part of deciding their potential role in litigation. In fact
the court decision highlighted the congressional skepticism about all
methods for measuring the value of natural resources. In explaining
the preference for restoration costs over a "lesser of" provision included
in the Department of Interior's rules for implementing damage assessment, the decision suggests that:
Whether a particular choice is efficient depends on how the
various alternatives are valued. Our reading of CERCLA does
not attribute to Congress an irrational dislike of 'efficiency;'
rather it suggests that Congress was skeptical of the ability
of human beings to measure the true 'value' of a natural re6
source.
The third contextual element concerns the Exxon Corporation
sponsored CVM research. In what may be the largest privately spon4. Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
5. The decision states:
"Our reading of the complex of relevant provisions concerning damages under
CERCLA convinces us that Congress established a distinct preference for restoration
cost as the measure of recovery in natural resource damage cases. This is not to say that
DOI may not establish some class of cases where other considerations, that is, unfeasibility
of restoration or grossly disproportionate cost to use value, warrant a different standard."
Id. at 55. Here the Court is adopting a broad definition of use value including what the
ruling describes as "passive use values" that correspond to all nonuse values.
6. Id. at 456-57.
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sored evaluation of an economic methodology, Exxon supported. research applying CVM to estimate the values for four different experimental commodities. The researchers criticized CVM, arguing that they7
had demonstrated that the CVM surveys did not measure preferences,
were incapable of estimating nonuse values 8 and even that it paral9
leled "voodoo practices".
While one might expect judgments about the plausibility of these
findings to await peer reviews, they have gained some measure of acceptance among economists unfamiliar with past CVM research. Indeed, a recent review of the use of CVM in natural resource damage
assessment in the HarvardLaw Review is one such exampleYm This review bases its critique of CVM exclusively on the Exxon research, following closely the summary prepared by ShavellU and concluded
observing that: "At least where nonuse values are concerned, CV will
always be the dart boardof valuation techniques-adart
board with num12
bers so inflated they seriously skew the scoring."
Any discussion of the performance of CVM enters a "highly
charged" public debate. In such a setting it is important to scrutinize
exactly what can be concluded from available research and to carefully
document the relevant qualifications. My criticisms of the CH review
are intended to reinforce their primary objective-stimulating a more
systematic evaluation of what we know about all of the methods for
estimating the values people have for non-marketed resources.
III. REAL ECONOMIC COMMITMENTS
CH argue that methods for measuring people's preferences or
values for any commodity should be consistent with the real economic
7. J. Hausman, Comments to NOAA Panel on Nonuse Damage Assessment
Methodology (July 22,1992) (unpublished comments submitted to National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration Contingent Valuation Panel, Department of Economics,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
8. D. McFadden, Comments on Constructed Market Methods for Attributing Nonuse
Values to Environmental Resources (July 10, 1992) (unpublished comments submitted
to National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Contingent Valuation Panel,
Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley).
9. J. Daum, Legal and Regulatory Aspects of Contingent Valuation (April 2-3, 1992)
(unpublished manuscript presented at the Cambridge Economics Inc. Symposium on
Contingent Valuation: A Critical Assessment, held in Washington, D.C.).
10. Note, "Ask a Silly Question... ": Contingent Valuationof NaturalResource Damages,
105 Harv. L. Rev. 1981 (1992).
11. S. Shavell, Should Contingent Valuation Estimates of the Nonuse Value of Natural
Resources Be Used in Public Decisionmaking and the Liability System? (April 2-3, 1992)
(unpublished manuscripts presented at the Cambridge Economics Inc. Symposium,

Contingent Valuation: A Critical Assessment held in Washington, D.C.).
12. See supra note 10, at 1990.
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commitments of individuals.13 They outline two questions to be answered
by an evaluation of CVM:
(1)
". :. does substantial evidence exist that would support the
claim that subject behavior within the CVM valuation institution is reasonably similar to behavior assumed in economic theory?" and
(2)
"... will people actually pay amounts reported in CVM surveys?"14
In developing their answer to the first question, CH consider
the experimental economics literature findings on the importance of
free-riding behavior. More specifically, they suggest that these experimental studies indicate that the record on free-riding behavior is quite
mixed. 15
Before turning to the experimental literature, we should determine how other empirical models intended to describe the behavior of
economic agents are evaluated, and whether these evaluation methods
hold promise in judging CVM.
13. CH credit the original source of this criterion to Measuring the Demand for
Environmental Quality (. Braden & C. Kolstad eds., 1991). In their introduction to the
volume, J. Braden, C. Kolstad and D. Miltz observe that "Imany economists are loathe
to base economic values-values that will be used to allocate real resources-on information
that does not grow out of real economic commitments." Id. at 12.
14. R. Cummings & G. Harrison, Identifying and Measuring Nonuse Values for Natural
and Environmental Resources: A CriticalReview of the State of the Art (1992) (published by
American Petroleum Institute).
15. This conclusion contrasts with the view of free-riding as unimportant that
sometimes has been attributed to Mitchell and Carson in R. Mitchell & R. Carson, Using
Surveys to Value Public Goods: The Contingent Valuation Method (1989) (published by
Resources for the Future). Actually these authors' conclusions relate to one specific
context. That is, Mitchell and Carson (MC) describe the context for their review of the
experimental literature and the conclusions they draw from that review in specific terms.
They note that they considered "a series of experiments which use nontrivial rewards
to test the prevalence of the free-riding form of strategic behavior under realistic fieldlike
conditions designed to produce free-riding." Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
While their conclusions are strongly stated, they are also qualified. For example, they
stated:
They [the experimental studies satisfying the criteria identified above]
demonstrate that strategic behavior occurs much less often than standard
utility maximization assumptions would predict, except where the person
is assured that he will get the good no matter what he says he will pay.
Even under this condition, free-riding occurs far less than most economists
would predict.
Id. at 139-40. The qualification also arises in a footnote where they identify some other
studies that they describe as deliberately structuring conditions to motivate people to
behave strategically, and MC concede that: "We believe not only that such conditions
exist, but that they are largely avoidable." Id. at 140 n.21. Because MC's conclusion is
not a general verdict on free-riding, it is possible to have two mutually exclusive and
seemingly contradictory readings of the experimental literature.
On the one hand, reviewers of the MC summary can criticize the studies they
selected, cite old and new evidence not included in their review, and observe that freeriding can be important. Yet MC can agree but argue that in practice, it will not be important
because the evidence is "clear enough" to prepare descriptions of CVM questions that
control strategic incentives.
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A. Background
An examination of the conventional model of consumer behavior
reveals how little of what we accept as "verified" by real economic
commitments is actually testable without a complete record of total
household expenditures. 16 Even in that case, what we can test is conditioned upon important assumptions usually arising from the data
available in each application. Moreover, if we examine the record for
assumed consumer behavior in these terms, it does not fare well.
Deaton's summary of the literature concluded that:
Although there is some variation in results through different data sets, different approximating functions, different estimation and testing strategies, and different commodity
disaggregation, there is a good deal of accumulated evidence
rejecting the restrictions [that is, homogeneity of degree zero
in prices and income and symmetry of the Slutsky substitution matrix]. The evidence is strongest for [rejecting] homogeneity, with less (or perhaps no) evidence against
symmetry over and above the restrictions embodied in homogeneity. Clearly, for any one model, it is impossible to separate failure of the model from failure of the underlying theory. 17
Overall, most of the experience of tests of the hypotheses implied by conventional demand theory even that using data for individual households, indicates that the test results are sensitive to the
definition of the commodities involved (and the implied level aggregation); the model specifications used; the treatment of durables; and
the assumed separability of labor/leisure from commodity consumption decisions. Despite the largely negative support for demand theory from these system-wide tests, most economists would likely regard
the general insights provided by consumer demand theory to have been
verified by empirical experience. 18 Understanding the reason for this
16. Indeed, applying a weaker criterion using the axioms of revealed preference to
evaluate demand theory, Varian observed that "The sad fact of the matter is that the
restrictions [revealed preference derived from utility maximization subject to a budget
constraint) only apply when we have observed the entire choice set. Hence, normal sorts
of tests of consistency of observed choice must be interpreted instead as tests for
separability of the observed choices from other variables in the utility function rather
than test of maximization per se." H. Varian, Revealed Preference With a Subset of Goods 46
1. Econ. Theory 179, 184 (1988).

17. A. Deaton, Demand Analysis, in 3 Handbook of Econometrics1767,1791 (Z. Griliches
& M. Intrilligator eds., 1986) (emphasis added).
18. Kiefer, using a micro data set for 3,000 Belgium households, is somewhat more
encouraging but not definitive. A test of the joint hypothesis of homogeneity and
symmetry would not be rejected at the five percent level. Homogeneity alone would
also not be rejected. However, both decisions are sensitive to the p-value selected for
the test. Both the joint (homogeneity and symmetry) hypotheses and the homogeneity
hypothesis on its own would be rejected at a ten percent level. N. Kiefer, Microeconomic
Evidence on the Neoclassical Model of Demand, 25 1. Econometrics 285 (1984).
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conclusion is important because it may provide a practical basis for
evaluating the consistency of CVM results with the assumptions of theory.
There are at least three sources of empirical evidence supporting demand theory as it is most often applied with simple, single good
demand models. They include:
(1)
weight-of-the-evidence judgments based on the response of demand to price and income change;
(2)
plausible demographic and attitudinal linkages; and
(3)
credible predictive performance for policy uses.
The first of these is largely what the description implies-consistent findings of negative effects for the good's price and positive
ones for income in the demand equation. Moreover, for broad commodity aggregates, there is approximately consistent classification of
commodities as between luxury (that is, with income elasticities appreciably larger than unity) and staples (income elasticities less than
unity). Price elasticities for the goods studied would probably be regarded as somewhat more variable. Nonetheless, in most circumstances
it has been possible a priori to develop classifications for commodities
into groups based on inelastic and elastic responses to price, and then
to confirm these relative size expectations implied by these groupings
with the independently estimated demand results.
With greater availability of micro-data, there has been more attention to demographic and attitudinal variables as proxy measures for
tastes in describing demand. Thus there has been increasing evidence
available for the second type of confirmation. In those cases where a
priori expectations could be formed for these types of influences, the
empirical evidence generally supports expectations. While these are confirming findings, it is also important to acknowledge that the results
are usually confined to agreement
of the sign of the specific variables
with prior expectations. 19
Finally, the estimates of price and income elasticities from simple demand models have generally been regarded as offering plausible predictions of demand impacts for policy initiatives that cause either
price or income changes. As with the first two criteria there have been
no specific studies that assembled systematic evidence supporting these
19. It should be noted that this conclusion is not the result of a systematic evaluation
of the existing empirical literature. For three examples where demographic variables
have been introduced into demand systems, see R. Pollak & T. Wales "Demographic
Variables in Demand Analysis," Econometrica, 1533-1551 (1981), R. Barnes & R. Gillingham,
"Demographic Effects in Demand Analysis: Estimation of the Quadratic Expenditure
Function Using Microdata," Rev. Econ. Stat. 591-611 (1984), and with a micro level panel,
see K.A. Mork & V.K. Smith, Testing the Life-Cycle Hypothesis with a Norwegian
Household Panel, J.of Bus. & Econ. Stat. 7, (1989).
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conclusions.20 Rather it is a judgment based on numerous articles reporting demand applications, textbooks citing specific demand studies as examples, demand analyses used in antitrust and other forms of
litigation, demand elasticity estimates role in the setting of prices for
regulated firms, and the practice of using elasticity estimates for policy forecasts.
B. Consistency of CVM with 'Real Economic Commitments'
There has been no systematic effort to document uses of CVM
estimates. Instead, a "folklore" has evolved based largely on personal
evaluations of the empirical record. Most CVM practitioners believe
the record shows that. CVM credibly estimates people's willingness to
pay (WTP), provided the specific application followed "established practices". Of course, the "established practice" is continuously changing
as experience with applications involving more difficult environmental commodities increases. Furthermore, because CVM respondents
must be given a choice in understandable and realistic terms, the evaluation of its success has a number of subjective elements.
Consider each of the three approaches that have been used to
evaluate empirical demand studies with marketed commodities as a
potential basis for judging whether CVM responses are consistent with
economic behavior (CH's first question). The first approach with marketed goods focused on observed responses to prices and income and
their consistency with what economic theory would suggest. Providing a systematic response to this question requires that environmental
resources' services be classified into groups of commodities (much as
marketed goods have been classified), a set of methods for measuring
the amounts of each service be specified, and the available CVM evidence on WTP for each category be reviewed to determine whether it
is consistent with the general properties implied by economic theory.
This would be an enormous task, well beyond the scope of this paper.
However, there have been some small steps taken in this direction. One
of these involves a meta analysis (i.e. a statistical summary) of travel
21
cost and contingent valuation studies by Walsh, Johnson and McKean.
Their analysis summarized estimates of the consumer surplus per day
of recreational activity from each type of study and found that the travel
cost and CVM summaries each yield distinctive values for different
20. Systematic statistical summaries have been confined to the marketing literature.
One example closely aligned with conventional economic models for consumer demand

involves modeling a demand for a firm's branded product using sales or market share
data. See G. Tellis, The Price Elasticity of Selective Demand: A Meta-Analysis of Econometric

Models of Sales, 25 J. Marketing Res. 331 (1988).
21. See R. Walsh et al., Nonmarket Values from Two Decades of Research on Recreation
Demand, 5 Advances in Applied Micro Economics 167-193 (A. Link & V. Smith eds., 1990)
(Consult Table 3).
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types of recreation. Their conclusions were based on measuring statistically significant coefficients for the qualitative variables used to take
account of the different types of recreation (including salt water and
anadromous fishing, big game hunting, and waterfowl hunting). Of
course, one might argue that these activities are familiar and what is
being measured resembles closely a private commodity.
Nonetheless, there is also some evidence that CVM estimates
of WTP for a less familiar and more difficult to measure (and describe)
commodity are also consistent with what economic theory would imply.
Two sets of evidence provide the basis for this preliminary judgment.
One follows from the important initial effort by Chestnut and Rowe 22
to summarize and compare people's WTP for visibility improvements
at national parks. The second is an extension to their work that Laura
23
Osborne and I have currently underway.
Using twenty estimates derived from four CVM studies for improvements in the visibility at recreation sites, they adjusted the estimates to constant dollars and fit a response surface relating the willingness
to pay (WTP) per visitor party per day (in 1988 dollars) to the logarithm of the ratio of the revised relative to the initial visibility (in miles)
together with this same variable interacted with a qualitative variable
identifying whether the studies involved Eastern National Park sites.
Both variables were found to be significant determinants of the deflated
WTP estimates. Laura Osborne and I confirmed and extended their analysis by expanding the set of estimates included in the summary, controlling for the how visibility change was presented, and adjusting for
the non-spherical nature of the error structure. The columns in Table 1
report some of the preliminary results from our analysis. Our summary
is confined to willingness-to-pay estimates for improving (or avoiding
deterioration in) visibility conditions at recreation sites. The studies
were limited to those that present the change in visibility conditions
as taking place with certainty. They generally used photographs that
depict how specific vistas would change as different air quality conditions alter the visible range.
Our analysis differs from Chestnut and Rowe in several ways.
The sample was composed using all available estimates from each CVM
analysis. Our measure for the visibility change approximates the proportionate change in the miles of visible range. The lowest level of visibility is treated as the base. We include a separate qualitative variable
22. L. Chestnut & R. Rowe, Economic Valuation of Changes in Visibility: A State of
the Science Assessment for NAPAP, in Acidic Deposition: State of Science and Technology,
Report No. 27 Methods for Valuing Acidic Deposition and Air Pollution Effects (1990).
23. V. Smith & L. Osborne, "Do Contingent Valuation Estimates Pass a 'Scope' Test?

A Preliminary Meta Analysis" paper presented at American Economic Association
Meetings, Boston, Mass. January 1994.
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(labeled as the direction of change) to indicate whether the question
posed improvement from a deteriorated state or avoiding a deteriorated state (that is, compensating versus equivalent measures of the
Hicksian surplus associated with the willingness to pay definition).
A second difference arises in the consideration given to other
potential determinants of CVM estimates of WTP. We included qualitative variables to adjust for how the valuation was asked--as an entrance fee or a charge in the next visit. Third, models were estimated
with sub-samples that deleted specific studies or locations to evaluate
whether the overall conclusions were influenced by the composition
of the sample. Finally, the estimated standard errors used in testing
the relationship between CVM estimates of the willingness to pay for
visibility improvements used Huber's adjustment for the non-spheri24
cal errors.
A number of models and tests were evaluated with these and
other CVM analyses of visibility changes. The principal issue of interest here is whether larger improvements in visibility lead to larger
monthly WTP estimates (in constant 1990 dollars). Our summary of
CVM estimates across these studies is clear in its support for a positive relationship. Models (1) and (5) report the ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimates of WTP for improved visibility using the full sample
with a partial versus a complete specification.
To evaluate the effects of sample composition three sub-samples were evaluated. Equation (3) deletes the estimates for Eastern
sites; (4) deletes the Decision Focus pilot study for small visibility
changes at the Grand Canyon;25 and (2) deletes estimates from both
the Eastern sites and the Decision Focus pilot study. None of these changes
affect the statistical significance or relative size of the estimated coefficient for visibility improvements.
Of course, finding consistent relationships between estimates
of WTP and different recreational activities or between WTP and one
aspect of visibility improvements at recreation sites like the Grand
Canyon does not imply that the CVM estimate of the willingness to
pay in each case is accurate. Moreover, it does not imply that this level
of consistency with theory would be found in comparable summaries
with other types of environmental resources. In many situations it may
24. The Huber adjustment used here is for heteroscedasticity and parallels the White
proposal for a consistent estimate of OLS estimates' covariance structure in these cases

see: P.Huber, The Behavior ofMaximum Likelihood Estimates under Non-StandardConditions,
in Proceedings of the Fifth Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability

221 (1967); H. White, A Heteroscedasticity-consistentCovarianceMatrixEstimatorand a Direct
Test for Heteroscedasticity,28 Econometrica 817 (1980).
25. W. Balson et at., Development and Design of a Contingent Valuation Survey for
Measuring the Public's Value for Visibility Improvements at the Grand Canyon National
Park (Sep. 1990) (Draft Report by Decision Focus, Inc., Los Altos, CA).
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be difficult to formulate a single quantitative scale for measuring changes
in the amount of the commodity that is offered. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that this type of consistent record replicated across
all environmental commodities would exceed the level of systematic
analysis and testing that underlies our acceptance of conventional demand studies for marketed commodities.
Turning to the second source approach for developing confirmatory evidence (that has been used for demand models based on marketed goods),-plausible relationships between the demographic and
attitudinal variables and demand or valuation responses-here the
record of CVM may be more detailed than with marketed commodities. This is at least partially due to the need for primary data collection to undertake CVM studies. While initial applications did not collect
attitude and perception measures, most recent studies have collected
this information and successfully used it in explaining people's responses to CVM questions involving risk, air and surface water quality, groundwater contamination, pesticide residues on food, aesthetic
water quality and availability, and
features of the landscape, drinking
26
applications.
other
numerous

26. For examples of these types of studies by resource or pollution type, see: R.
Carson et al., A Contingent Valuation Study of Lost Passive Use Values Resulting from
the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, report to the Attorney General of the State of Alaska (Nov.
10, 1992) (Natural Resource Damage Assessment, Inc.) (one of the most extensive large
scale contingent valuation studies based on in-person, state-of-the-art interviews done
for the State of Alaska); V. Smith & W. Desvousges, Risk Communication and the Value of
Information: Radon as a Case Study, 82 Rev. Econ. Stat. 137 (1990) (environment risk); W.
Evans & W. Viscusi, Estimation of State Dependent Utility Functions Using Survey Data, 83
Rev. Econ. Stat. 94 (1991) (also environmental risk); P Jakus & V. Smith, Measuring Use
and Nonuse Values for Landscape Amenities: The Case of Gypsy Moth Control (Jan.
1992) (paper presented at Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, New
Orleans, LA) (aesthetic dimensions of landscape); Y. Eom & V. Smith, "Calibrated
NonMarket Valuation" January 1994 (unpublished paper, Resource and Environmental
Economics Program, North Carolina State University); E. van Ravenswaay & J. Hoehn,
Contingent Valuation and Food Safety: The Case of Pesticide Residues in Food (1991)
(Staff Paper No 91-13, Dept. of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University); G.
McClelland et al., Methods for Measaring Nonuse Values: A Contingent Valuation Study
of Groundwater Cleanup (Oct. 1992) (on file at U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
and the Center for Economic Analysis, University of Colorado); J. Powell, The Value of
Groundwater Protection: Measurement of Willingness to Pay Information and Its Utilization
by Local Government Decisionmakers (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Dept. of
Agricultural Economics, Cornell University); R. Carson & R. Mitchell, Economic Value
of Reliable Water Supplies for Residential Water Users in the State Water Project Service
Area (1987) (report prepared for the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California,
Washington, D.C.); D. Whittington et al., Giving Respondents Time to Think in Contingent
Valuation Studies: A Developing Country Application, 25 J. Envtl. Econ. Mgmt. 205 (1992).
A detailed bibliography of over 1,600 references related to contingent valuation can be
found in A Bibliography of Contingent Valuation Studies and Papers (1994) (published
by Natural Resource Damage Assessment, Inc., La Jolla, CA).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 34

On the last element cited as a component used in judgments
of conventional demand models-successful policy uses-there has
been little scope to use CVM estimates to predict behavioral outcomes
for policy purposes and then evaluate the outcomes. For the most part,
CVM estimates associated with environmental resources have been
used in benefit-cost analyses (or more recently, as CH note, in damage
assessments) where there is little or no opportunity to observe what
has been estimated or predicted.
Overall, considering CH's first question, it would be possible
to apply the same types of standards used in evaluating conventional
demand studies to CVM estimates. To date, there have been few systematic efforts to undertake this task. Based on some preliminary results from meta analyses of CVM studies for valuing visibility
improvements, it appears that CVM's WTP estimates are broadly consistent with the implications that can be developed from economic theory.
CH's second question in evaluating whether CVM represent
real economic commitments concerns whether people actually pay
what they state. Here CH describe some of the past evidence and their
own (with Rutstrdm) findings using simulated markets (i.e. markets
constructed under experimental conditions for real commodities). In
these situations, a reward system is not used to induce subjects' preferences. Instead, the analyst must rely on structuring the incentives so
that truth-telling is the incentive compatible response. Because it may
take time for subjects to have confidence that the incentives actually
work this way, the experiment must either: (a) provide them opportunities to acquire experience with the institutions (or rules) providing
these incentives, or (b) "teach" them what they would have learned
from that experience. The analyst's knowledge of actual preferences
(and therefore, real economic commitments) is conditional upon how
successfully these tasks are accomplished. Of course, this is true of any
test. There are always maintained hypotheses. This is not my point.
Rather, my concern is whether our ability to adequately exercise these
controls and thereby establish conditions comparable to an experienced choice is itself influenced by whether private and public good
is involved in the experiment.
To illustrate my point, consider first the strategies used to construct these types of simulated markets with private goods. Two types
have been used-auctions and direct sales. In the first case, an incentive compatible process is designed. Each individual may be uncertain
about whether he (or she) will acquire a specific commodity. The rules
are designed to induce truthful responses.27 Direct sales are also a pos27. Many of the experimental studies allow participants to engage in "practice"

rounds with "instruction" to assure that they understand what a rational response to
the incentives implies for their behavior. Even with practice rounds, differences in the

behavior of experienced versus inexperienced subjects can be pronounced.
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sible method for comparing hypothetical and actual responses with private commodities. However, using this approach to recover valuation
information requires that the analyst supply prior information about
how participants' decisions relate to their demands or preferences (that
is, demand functions must be specified).
Implementing both approaches inevitably involves analyst judgment. In the case of auctions, one might ask how the experimenter gives
subjects sufficient experience to understand the implications of the incentives without providing what might be interpreted as clues about
other participants' responses or values. Does the experience transfer
across different types of goods? This argument parallels the selection
process Mitchell Carson report they used in evaluating the free-riding
experiments (see note #15). That is, there are circumstances where we
can control the rules (and experience) so the experiment is credible.
There may be others (involving public goods) where the change in rules
is so great as to reduce the control and therefore the confidence in the
experiments. Reduced variation in the bids in actual versus hypothetical markets does not in itself mean that these are more accurate reflections of their true values. It may mean people have learned what
they believed (from their past experience or instruction) to be the "correct" response. When we consider direct sales, the process of specifying and estimating demand (or other behavioral models) can lead to
large variations in the estimated values.28 This is not simply a criticism
28. In J. Hausman & G. Leonard, Contingent Valuation and the Value of Marketed
Commodities (July 24, 1992) (unpublished paper, Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology) the re-analysis of the strawberry experiment, see M. Dickie et
al., Market Transactionsand Hypothetical Demand Data:A ComparativeStudy, 82 J. Am. Stat.
Ass'n 69 (1987)(hereafter known as DFG for this discussion), found the conclusions about
a correspondence between actual sales and purchase intentions were sensitive to how
the data were treated in the estimation. Indeed, replicating the Hausman-Leonard
preferred estimator with a count data Poisson model using the original DFG data indicates
the key parameter estimates (from an economic perspective) are more sensitive to the
model specification than to the use of an actual versus a hypothetical sales context. For
the specifications reported here, the sensitivity is greatest for actual sales and is not as
pronounced using the hypothetical sales data. This raises the basic issue-which modeloriginal DFG or the reduced specification to use in any comparisons between them.
Applying a less mechanical perspective and comparing the range of parameter
estimates across specifications, there is a remarkably close correspondence between the
demand models estimated based on real and hypothetical sales. The following table
illustrates this pattern for the parameters of price and income, using the Poisson count
estimator with linear in independent variables models:
Actual Sale
Hypothetical Sale
Model Specification
Price
Income
Price
Income
Original DFG specification1.958
32 x 10-3
-1,904
.16 x 10-3
(-3.42)
(2.24)
(4.28)
(1.19)
Deleting Dummy Variables
-1.941
33 x 10 -2.042
.27 x 10
for Income Stratum
(-3.47)
(2.45)
(-4,56)
(2.33)
Price, Income, Household
-1.375
.10 x 10 - 3
-1.937
.27 x 10-3
size, interviewer teams
(-3.00)
(1.09)
(-4.91)
(2.71)
(numbers in parentheses are Z statistics for the null hypothesis of no association)
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of contingent valuation data. It is a reflection of the role of analyst judgment in the implementation of most microeconomic models.
As this research has changed the commodity from a private to
a public good, there has been a subtle but important change in what
was offered to people. It has not been a change in a public good, but
instead a lottery with some individuals making payments (in the "real"
component of these experiments) that did not assure them of any change
in the public goods involved. This feature characterizes work by Seip
and Strand, Kealy et al., and Duffield and Patterson. 29 Neither the real
nor the CVM versions of these surveys indicate how their respective
lotteries would be resolved. As a consequence, it is impossible to evaluate how these mechanisms might be expected to perform using a simple public good. The commodity that is offered and understood by people
could well be different for each participant, depending on how each
person perceives these lotteries. There are theoretical and design-related reasons for questioning many of the earlier experiments supporting
criticisms of the expected utility (EU) framework. It seems that most
of the experiments testing preference reversals (and other violations
of EU behavior) can themselves be questioned. Some involve compound lotteries (constructed to avoid income effects; reduce experimental costs; or meet other objectives). In these cases, Holt [19861 has
These conclusions contrast with the Hausman and Leonard judgments which
seem to imply the observed differences are inconsistent with applied econometric
experience across model specifications in other contexts involving actual decisions and
because of this variability, imply we should reject contingent valuation. In contrast with
their conclusions, this level of sensitivity should not be surprising given the sample sizes
involved, the use of micro data, and the presence of a number of zero consumption
choices.
Indeed, some time ago in another context Berndt, see E. Berndt, Reconciling
Alternative Estimates of the Elasticity of Substitution, 58 Rev. Econ. Stat. 59 (1976), used the
variation in assumptions about the treatment of capital measurement and the definition
of rental prices for capital to explain the wide differences in estimates of the elasticities
of substitution between labor and capital. More recently, Hazilla and Kopp, see M.
Hazilla & R. Kopp, Systematic Effects of Capital Service Price Definition on Perceptions of
Input Substitution, 4 J. Bus. Econ. Stat. 209 (1986), performed a more detailed empirical
evaluation of how these assumptions influence estimates of the elasticities of substitution
using a common data set for 36 sectors.
A similar message emerges for studies involving the indirect methods for
nonmarket evaluation. For example, my meta analysis of travel cost recreation demand
estimates considering both the consumer surplus per unit of use and the price elasticity
of demand with Y. Kaoru, see V. Smith & Y. Kaoru, Signals or Noise? Explaining the
Variation in Recreation Benefit Estimates, 72 Am. J. Agric. Econ. 419 (1990); V. Smith & Y.
Kaoru, What have We Learned Since Hotelling's Letter: A Meta Analysis, 32 Econ. Letters
267 (1990), found the estimates were sensitive to modeling assumptions comparable to
those raised by Hausman and Leonard.
29. K. Seip & J. Strand, Willingness to Pay for Environmental Goods in Norway: A
Contingent Valuation Study with Real Payments, 2 Envtl. Resource Econ. 91 (1992); M. Kealy
et al., Reliability and Predictive Validity of Contingent Valuation: Does the Nature of the Goods
Matter?, 19 J. Envtl. Econ. Mngmt. 244 (1990); J. Duffield & D. Patterson, Field Testing
Existence Values: An Instream Flow Trust Fund for Montana Rivers (Jan. 1992).
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noted that their tests of transitivity rely on a strong form of the independence axiom. This axiom assures the lottery choice and selling price
elicitation will be separable.30 As a result, the test of transitivity should
not be separated from the maintained assumption of the independence
axiom, because the latter is central to the test. Once this connection is
recognized, we cannot attribute rejections of transitivity to that feature
of the experiment. It may be the maintained assumption of independence that is inconsistent with behavior.
Equally important, Harrison has demonstrated that the nature
of the financial incentives influences the ability (i.e. the power) of experiments in detecting violations of EU behavior.31 The absence of distinctive incentives (as between the null and alternative hypotheses) was
an important factor in his explanation of violations of the expected utility model-whether preference reversals, the Allais paradox, or prospect
theory.
This digression is important to my argument for two reasons.
The framing of all public goods involved in past experimental comparisons of real and hypothetical valuation tasks has actually offered
respondents lotteries. Interpreting their findings on the consistency between CVM and actual responses (or lack of it) requires that we describe how people perceived the lotteries and interpreted them in
formulating their contingent and actual responses.
Equally important, the past twenty years of testing for preference reversals reveals how extraordinarily difficult it would be to satisfy the criteria that CH have recommended for evaluating CVM. Judging
whether responses are consistent with the predictions of economic models and if the payments would be made, each requires maintained assumptions to implement. With them, we find a cascading set of
qualifications that must themselves be evaluated as part of our interpretation of their relevance for the performance of CVM.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS AND CVM
CH use two types of experimental evidence in their evaluation
of contingent valuation. The first is associated with "conventional" economic experiments. These are generally assumed to involve situations
where the participants' preferences are controlled by the analyst. This
control is accomplished by defining a payoff or reward scheme in monetary units that relates to the amount of the experimental commodity
each participant receives or sells.
30. C. Holt, Preference Reversals and the Independence Axiom, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 508
(1986).
31. See G. Harrison, Expected Utility Theory and the Experimentalists (Sept. 1990)
(Dept. of Economics working paper B-90-04, University of South Carolina); G. Harrison,
Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions: Reply, 82 Am. Econ. Rev. 1426 (1992).
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The second type of experiment involves situations where the
analyst does not control participants' preferences. Demand revealing
mechanisms are assumed to induce each participant to reveal his (or
her) true value for the commodities involved. Labelled as experiments
involving "homegrown values" in contrast to the "induced values" of
the conventional approach, these studies are more diverse in the control exercised over experimental conditions.
When the conventional experiments have involved public goods,
they have used one of two types of institutions to determine how the
amount of the public good is determined from participant interactions-a Smith (or unanimity) auction and a voluntary contribution
framework. 32 As CH note, there is little to be learned from either decision rule about how contingent valuation surveys will perform. Because of this incompatibility between the rules governing each approach
to understanding people's behavior, CH reconsider the evidence from
conventional experiments on free-riding and use experiments involving "homegrown values" to comment on whether CVM accurately measures people's willingness to pay.
A. Free-riding
CH's discussion of free-riding is organized to assess whether
the Mitchell and Carson summary of the evidence accurately represents current views on strategic behavior. CH (and Plott in a separate
critique of Mitchell and Carson) argue it does not, observing that the
mixed evidence from both Smith auctions and voluntary contribution
schemes indicate that there are circumstances when people undertake
33
strategic behavior.
A central question that is not addressed in their summary (or
in Plott's evaluation) concerns whether components of this mixed record
are more likely to be relevant to the circumstances one might encounter
in applying CVM to measure natural resource damages. One feature
of the design of these experiments may be especially relevant. It concerns the commodity specification.
Natural resource damage assessment seeks to use nonmarket
valuation in two different tasks-valuing the services lost to measure
interim lost values (including both use and nonuse values or "passive
use") and estimating future losses that arise because a restoration plan
32. V. Smith, The Principle of Unanimity and Voluntary Consent in Social Choice, 85 J.
Pol. Econ. 1125 (1977).
33. C. R. Plott, Contingent Valuation Methods as Applied to Nonuse of Natural
Resources: Evidence from Experiments (July 21, 1992) (testimony for National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration Contingent Valuation Panel, Division of Humanities
and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology).
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does not return the resource to baseline conditions. In both situations
the commodity specification seems likely to involve services that are
not readily perceived as divisible. 34 This is relevant to the experimental
literature because most experiments unnecessarily introduce a perception of divisibility and a unit "price" to participants.
This approach has been used in experiments involving the unanimity and voluntary contribution frameworks. Experimental instructions state that the good is available at a fixed marginal cost (or price)
whose value is known to participants. 35 This structure treats the public good as divisible. While it is consistent with the usual conditions
for efficient levels of provision for public goods, it does not parallel the
circumstances generally encountered in the contingent valuation analyses for natural resource damage assessments. In these cases, the definition of the commodity and how it would be impacted by any restoration
activities are central questions in framing a CVM analysis.
Two sets of experiments have investigated situations where divisibility and a constant unit cost were not part of the design. The
Schneider-Pommerehne study (originally cited by Mitchell and Carson) avoided the unit cost and divisibility issue by stating a total cost
and by offering an examination copy of a textbook. 3 6 However, selecting the text as the commodity also converts this study from an induced preference to a "homegrown value" experiment.
The second study involving some experiments without unit
cost and divisibility issues (by Marwell and Ames) is also not an ideal
basis for a judgment.3 7 Their evaluation of the effects of divisibility involved two sets of incoming undergraduates. One group was given a
schedule of payments in discrete intervals, where positive provision
and individual payoff required a group contribution of at least 2000 to34. Indeed, an important implication of the Exx6n-sponsored CVM research is that
surveys relying on artificial definitions of divisible changes in commodities that people
do not perceive in that way are unlikely to provide plausible estimates of their willingness
to pay.
35. Examples of these types of instructions include most of the studies evaluating
public goods that were cited by CH. See, e.g., J. Banks et al., An Experimental Analysis of

Unanimity in Public Goods Provision Mechanisms, 40 Rev. Econ. Stud. 301 (1988); R. Isaac
et al., Public Goods Provision in an Experimental Environment, 26 J. Pub. Econ. 51 (1985);
G. Harrison & J. Hirshleifer, An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest Link/Best Shot Models
of Public Goods, 97 J. Pol. Econ. 201 (1989). But R. Isaac & J. Walker, Group Size Effects in
Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary ContributionsMechanism, 103 Q. J. Econ. 179 (1988),
appears to be a notable exception to this framing of constant marginal cost, divisible
public goods in many of the laboratory public goods experiments. It is impossible to
separate the effects of this specification from other changes in determining the overall
implications of the change for strategic behavior.
36. F. Schneider & W. Pommerehne, Free Riding and Collective Action: An Experience

in Public Microeconomics, 96 Q. J. Econ. 689 (1981).
37. G. Marwell & R. Ames, Economists FreeRide, Does Anyone Else? Experiments on the
Provision of Public Goods, IV, 15 J. Pub. Econ. 295 (1981).
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kens (each person received 225 tokens to be divided between a private
and a group or public good). The indivisible group were given the same
instructions, but told the payoff "... had to be spent on a group project. They could choose anything they wanted on which to spend the
money, such as a party or a hi-fi for their floor, so long as there was
something purchased collectively." 38
They report dramatic differences in the percentage of resources
allocated to the group or public good. Forty-three percent was invested
by the subjects receiving a divisible commodity with private returns
based on the provision point restriction and 84 percent for the group
receiving the indivisible case.
Unfortunately, by failing to describe a decision rule for selecting the group project, they have offered what could easily be regarded
as a compound lottery with greatly varying perceptions across participants. Thus, while this experiment provides evidence consistent with
a conclusion that there is limited scope for free-riding when the commodities are indivisible public goods, there are good reasons to question whether divisibility alone is responsible for the outcome. Moreover,
it is not clear this experiment satisfies Harrison's criteria for distinctive incentives, allowing analysts to effectively isolate the behavior implied by null and alternative hypotheses.
Overall then, this review of the literature from conventional
experiments agrees with CH that interpreting Mitchell and Carson's
(MC) conclusions as a general precis of all experiments investigating
free-riding would not adequately represent the diversity of current evidence on the free-riding hypothesis. However, it is also important to
note that MC did not claim to be offering such a general evaluation.
Instead, they used experimental evidence available at the time to argue
it was possible to frame problems involving public goods so that freeriding responses would be minimized. CH do not address this issue.
Plott's criticism of the Mitcheil-Carson summary also avoids the question of whether we know enough to "frame our way out of free-riding
problems." Instead, he suggests that free-riding in conventional settings can be serious, noting that:
The first instinct of people faced with a public goods/freeriding/prisoner's dilemma situation is to produce outward
signs of cooperative behavior. In the context of public goods
in which people face incentives, they tend to make first period (of a several period process) voluntary contributions.
The level falls short of that suggested in the quotation from
Mitchell and Carson but it could be as high as 25 percent to
50 percent of an objectively known level of incentives...
Cooperation usually erodes rapidly in subsequent periods
38. Id. at 306.
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choices. While complete free-riding seldom occurs, the level
of contributions are near the Nash equilibrium levels with a
bias toward the cooperative options. The nature and speed
of the decay process is a function of the structure of the paya high marginal payoff to cooperaoff. Environments with 39
tion decay more slowly.
To the extent the propensity to undertake free-riding is influenced by divisibility in the public good, as might be implied by Marwell and Ames, then the available experiments cited here and in CH
do not allow a judgment on whether free-riding will be present in these
situations. Moreover, th-ere have been no experiments to evaluate the
degree to which analysts can avoid free-riding with variations in the
framing used to elicit respondents' WTP.
B. Homegrown Values and CVM
The second type of experiment discussed in CH's evaluation of
CVM concerns the use of simulated markets. However, in contrast to
Bishop and Heberlein or Dickie, Fisher and Gerking, Cummings et al.
use a "laboratory" setting. 40 In an attempt to avoid the influence of individual preferences and constraints, some of their experiments used
"paired" hypothetical and real sales. Two commodities-an electric
juicer and a box of chocolate truffles-were considered for these paired
(or "in sample") experiments. That is, separate groups of respondents
for each commodity are offered hypothetical and actual purchase decisions. 41 Their evaluation of the performance of CVM is based on the
fraction of stated choices in comparison with the actual purchases.
Four issues are relevant to these comparisons. First, the wording of their hypothetical question (in the "in-sample" experiments) emphasized before offering each commodity that "We are not actually
offering you the opportunity to buy the juicer." Then participants were
asked whether they would pay at a stated price. Those subjects participating in the in-sample experiments proceeded to the "real sale"
component and were told "We would now like to give you the opportunity to actually buy the juicer (the chocolate truffles) at the price of
(the commodity involved in the experiment). Note that you do not have
39. Plott, supra note 33, at 12-13.
40. R. Bishop & T. Heberlein, Measuring Values of Extra Market Goods: Are Indirect
Measures Biased?, 61 Am. J. Agric. Econ. 926 (1979); R. Bishop & T. Heberlein, Does
Contingent Valuation Work?, in R. Cummings et al., Valuing Environmental Commodities
(1986); Dickie et al., supra note 28.
41. Based on the descriptions in R. Cummings et al., Homegrown Values and
Hypothetical Surveys: Is the Dichotomous Choice Approach Incentive Compatible? (Oct.
1992) (working paper B-92-12 Division of Research, College of Business Administration,
University of South Carolina), the experiments for the calculators involved independent
samples of respondents for the hypothetical and actual sales.
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to say the same thing that you did on the previous question." (emphasis added)42 The process then proceeded to ask if each individual
would purchase the relevant commodity at the same stated price.
While one must distinguish between hypothetical and real sales
as part of eliciting participants' decisions, all of the literature in CVM
suggests that the wording can matter. It is impossible to evaluate
whether it did in the cases they considered. Research available after
their experiments were completed suggests that investigation of the
reasons why respondents made particular decisions can be important.
For example, Carson et al., used this strategy to design sensitivity tests
for their CVM estimates of a household's willingness to pay to prevent
another Exxon Valdez type oil spill. 43 Respondents to the CH and R
experiments could have interpreted the first question as requesting a
judgment about whether the juicer was worth a certain amount, not
as a purchase intention. In these cases, it is conceivable that those participants owning juicers (or with no preference for fresh squeezed juice)
could answer "yes" and yet not purchase the juicer. Similar explanations could be offered for the chocolates.
A second concern arises with the metric used to evaluate CVM.
CH and R rely on the fractions stating a purchase choice. Their testing
strategy involves comparing the aggregate demand functions implied
by individuals' stated and actual purchase decisions at a point. 44 By
using in-sample experiments, they control for differences in the mix of
42. Id. at 41. This statement was not included in their experiments involving independent
subjects, where solar calculators were sold and in the reference experiments involving
only one treatment for the juicer and chocolates.
43. See R. Carson et al., A Contingent Valuation Study of Lost Passive Use Values
Resulting from the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (Nov. 10, 1992) (report to Attorney General
of the State of Alaska, published by NRDA Inc., San Diego, CA).
As I note in the last section, the NOAA Contingent Valuation Panel also
highlighted the need to include these follow up questions along with checks on
understanding and acceptante.
There is an interesting parallel in proposals to use these follow up questions
in screening CVM responses or improving statistical models for them, and the proposal
by M. Blackburn et al., Statistical Bias Functions and Informative Hypothetical Surveys
(Feb. 1992) (Economics Working Paper B90-02, Div. of Research, College of Businss
Administration, University of South Carolina), to model the inconsistencies observed
between contingent and actual choices for the paired samples.
In their case, they find that using a statistical model for the inconsistencies and
conclude on a cautiously positive note that some calibration (analogous to what is done
in marketing research) may be possible. The former analysis could well yield possible
calibrating adjustments to CVM responses.
44. There are a variety of maintained assumptions that would imply a test of consistency
in individual demands could be conducted at an aggregate level, given an assumption
of interior solutions at the individual level. For example, Lau's extension, see L. Lau, A
Note on the Fundamental Theorem of Exact Aggregation, 9 Econ. Letters 119 (1982), of the
Gorman aggregation conditions could be used to formulate consistent aggregate demand
specifications, see, e.g., D. Jorgenson et al., Two Stage Budgeting and Exact Aggregation,
6 J. Bus. Econ. Stat. 313 (1988). The paired in-sample comparisons of CVM and actual
purchases assure control over the demographic, preference related and other constraint
related variables.
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preferences, constraints, and other factors that might be argued to in45
fluence the aggregate quantity demanded across different samples.
This does not evaluate how either source of data performs in
estimating people's WTP for the commodities being sold (recall the two
questions noted earlier that comprise the CH criteria for gauging real
economic commitments). Moreover, it is not the way these data would
be used in practice. Analysts would assume that people have different
preferences and/or constraints. As such, they would seek a model that
margin of
recognized the decision as one taking place at the extensive
46
choice and model the responses within that framework.
Estimates of willingness to pay would be conditional upon the
maintained assumptions used to describe respondents' circumstances
and preferences. In such a micro context, the analyst's ability to recover
a (WTP) estimate depends upon the extent to which the experiments
47
recover estimates of respondents' responses to price, income, or both.
At the aggregate level, the issue is different because we are not
evaluating the ability to estimate WTP. The objective is to gauge the
consistency of the quantity estimates provided by the two frameworks.
This evaluation reveals nothing about the ability of either framework
to estimate WTP. This follows from the discrete nature of each individual's choice. At the respondent level, each person's actual choice
will indeed be based on his (or her) preferences and constraints. But
suppose the individual already has a juicer or calculator. Price and income are irrelevant to the decision for actual choices. By contrast for
hypothetical choice, the same respondent may well be inclined to report whether the object would be worth the stated price (perhaps because he had paid that amount or more in making a past purchase).
Such responses could provide a credible estimate of WTP, but not of
actual demand at the time of the survey because some of that demand
had already resulted in purchases. To evaluate whether these differences are important requires both variation in prices and an analysis
of demand at the individual level. Unfortunately, the CH and R experiments focused on tests using the proportion agreeing to purchase
the commodity and therefore are addressing hypotheses that parallel
the aggregate demand question. Such evaluations do not address the
issue of how accurately each method measures individual WTP. Only
45. For two of the three commodities, the CH and R experiments include in-sample
comparisons and out-of-sample comparisons to gauge the order effect of asking the
hypothetical questions before actual purchase questions.
46. See S. Pudney, Modeling Individual Choice: The Econometrics of Corners, Kinks
and Holes (1989) for an overview of the econometric issues involved with modeling
individual choice at the extensive margin.
47. The differences depend upon how the cost of the item is posed, whether multiple
unit purchases would be feasible, and the prior theoretical restrictions maintained in
the specification and estimation of the models.
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the calculator experiments included cases where there was some price
variation across experimental groups. 48 It is possible to offer some preliminary evidence that suggests these issues may be important.
Consider two different uses of results from the CH and R calculator experiments. 49 They report seven experiments-four groups
with hypothetical purchases and three real purchases, varying prices
from $3 to $7. Using their aggregate data for either hypothetical or real
with the six experiments,50 we would conclude that there is no relationship between the price charged and the purchase decision. Moreover, after accounting for the price, the distinction between real and
hypothetical purchases would not be judged to be a significant influence on the purchase decisions. Table 2 summarizes these estimates for
the six experiment analyses based on a simple log-odds framework.
[A no decision is coded as one and yes as zero in these estimates.]
Of course, analyzing these experiments in a pooled format at
an aggregate level is likely to be considered unfair to the authors because the no test would be powerful with such small samples. A discrete choice model re-estimated using the individual responses addresses
this issue and offers the prospect for evaluating whether the models
provide a plausible basis for estimating individual WTP. Table 3 summarizes these results. The first column indicates that participants in
the real sales had statistically a significantly greater probability of responding no in the actual sales, as Cummings and Harrison observed
comparing the estimated sample proportions with their paired sample
tests.
However, what their testing strategy misses is that neither of
the samples, real or hypothetical, would have been accepted as a plausible basis for estimating the 'typical" student's willingness to pay
for a calculator. To develop estimates of the Hicksian consumer surplus requires that the analysis recover estimates of a price effect on the
purchase decision. Neither estimated equation indicates price was a
significant determinant of the participants' responses. Indeed, the only
factor that was found to be a consistently significant determinant of
stated and actual purchases-whether the participant owns a calculator-had an estimated influence that agreed with our a prioriexpecta48. The juicer experiments involved two prices ($8 and $12), but the results are
summarized together and the data appendix includes only the results for the $8 experiments.
See McKinley, supra note 43 (Table 1), for a summary of the composite results. When
compared with CH and R, the rates for the higher price can be inferred.

49. This comparison would not be possible without complete access to the experimental
data which CH and R kindly made available along with all the papers describing their

findings. The calculator experiments were selected because they are the only ones with
complete data available that varied the prices for the commodities.
50. This choice was selected because it parallels the tests used in their evaluation of
actual versus hypothetical sales.
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tions in both samples. Moreover, the estimated coefficients from the
two models were not significantly different.5 1
Finally, there is an important lesson in four sets of evidence that
have been used to gauge the performance of CVM. 5 2 As we move from
commodities with private components and readily divisible services to
those that are best treated as indivisible, purely public goods (and are
the ones most likely to be encountered when CVM analyses are developed for natural resource damage assessments), we cannot assume
CVM's performance (whether good or bad) will be independent of the
commodities involved.
V. OBSERVED BEHAVIOR AND NONUSE VALUES
Revealed preference, as it has been applied in measuring the
values people place on nonmarket public goods, is a misnomer. Behavior alone tells us nothing about how much people value a nonmarketed
public good. To recover information about people's willingness to pay,
we must be prepared to accept either unverifiable assumptions about
preferences in the form of weak complementarity or to observe a sitespecific link between that commodity and some other marketed good.5 3
With this second approach, it is also necessary to assume those purchasing the marketed good observe the nonmarketed commodity in
terms closely related to what can be measured at the site-specific level.
This logic has provided the basis for the estimated use values associated with the indirect valuation methods.
As noted at the outset, Larson has proposed adapting another
set of unverifiable restrictions on preferences to measure nonuse values.5 4 Two aspects of his proposed method are important. First, it redefines nonuse values to be monetary measures of the Marshallian
adjustments observed in a commodity that is known in advance to be
Hicks-neutral to the environmental resource (that is, the Hicksian demand for the commodity does not change with changes in the environmental resource). By definition there is no use value underlying any
51, Because the estimated coefficients are normalized by the standard error for the
model's error, our test involves evaluatiag whether the ratio of the coefficient to the
standard error would be judged to be different between the two models.
52. The four sets of evidence evdluating CVM include: (a) comparisons of indirect
methods with CVM, (b) use of simulated markets and CVM, (c) conventional laboratory
experiments and CVM and (d) experiments based on homegrown values and CVM.
53. J. LaFrance, Incomplete Demand Systems, Weak Separability, and Weak
Complementarity in Applied Welfare Analysis: Expanded Version, (Dec. 1992) (working
paper No. 77, Dept. of Agricultural Economics, University of Arizona) develops a related
argument in his recent critique of the value of weak complementarity in recovering estimates
of the use value of nonmarketed resource.
54. It originated in Neill's, see J. Neill, Another Theorem on Using Market Demands to
Determine Willingness to Pay for Non-Traded Goods, 15 J. Envtl. Econ. Mgmt. 224 (1988),
proposed method for developing bounds for the marginal values of nonmarketed goods.
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observed changes in the demand for this commodity in response to the
environmental resources (as measured using its Hicksian demand).
Under these conditions, an observed change in the Marshallian demand
for this commodity in response to a change in the resource must be the
result of nonuse value for the resource.
Second, and equally important, the method assumes that there
exist measures of the quantity of the resource that serve equally well
in indicating how its services contribute to use-related adjustments in
commodities that are Hicksian substitutes or complements as well as
for goods that are Hicks-neutral to the environmental resource.
Larson's approach is an ingenious re-definition of the types of
preference-based relationships that can link marketed goods to nonmarketed environmental resources. While it does not capture situations where there is no link possible (that is, Hanemann's definition of
nonuse values),55 there is a more basic question to be raised. How does
one identify the marketed good(s) that is (are) Hicks neutral to specific environmental resources? Hicksian responses are unobservable.
As Bockstael and McConnell have suggested, we can only identify negative lower bounds for the value of a nonmarketed resource using
complementarity relationships and these
Hicksian substitution and
56
convey no information.
The point to be emphasized is that the strategy used in implementing conceptual methods for recovering valuation information matters to the estimates. As one attempts to extend these approaches from
use to nonuse values, the results should not be regarded as reflecting
"real economic commitments" simply because they are associated with
real choices. They are equally likely to be the result of analysts' assumptions (or perhaps less kindly, "guesses") that must be treated as
articles of faith to recover measures of use and nonuse values.
VI. GENUINE ECONOMIC VALUES, CVM, AND NATURAL
RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
Tardiness occasionally can have its rewards. The final version
of this paper was completed after the report of NOAA's Contingent
Valuation Panel became available. As a result, it is possible to reflect
on their recommendations as part of a summary of the issues raised
by the Cummings and Harrison paper. Four issues will be considered:
(1) the valuation tasks required by natural resource damage assess55. W. Hanemann, Three Approaches to Defining 'Existence' or Nonuse Values under
Certainty (1988) (unpublished paper, Dept. of Agricultural and Resource Economics,
University of California).
56. N. Bockstael & K. McConnell, Public Goods as Characteristics of Non-Market
Commodities Economic Journal, Vol. 103, Sept 1993 1244-1257.
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ments; (2) CVM information used by the Ohio court; (3) CummingsHarrison-Rutstr6m experiments and CVM; and finally, (4) the NOAA
Panel's recommendation and the evidence on CVM's ability to measure "Genuine Economic Values".
The monetary values sought in a damage assessment are rather
specific and depend upon the injury to the natural resources involved.
The use of CVM in this context does not necessarily seek a market value
for environmental resources involved in these assessments. Because these
resources are assets that can provide both private and public good services, the values must reflect both types of services. Market outcomes
for these natural assets would not necessarily reflect the values for public good services. Equally important, even if there existed markets for
these assets (and public good services were unimportant to these assets' values to society), it is not clear the asset price would be the correct measure of damage. The law requires consideration of how the
injuries affect the services from the asset and therefore how injury related changes in services would alter the asset's price. Thus, even in
this most extreme example (without public good services), the valuarelationship to the private
tion task depends on the injuries and their
57
services provided by natural resources.
Good practice in all fields requires that we periodically update
conventional procedures as research increases our knowledge base.
However, CH seem to imply more than this concern to learn from experience in describing current views about contingent valuation. For
example, CH's stated motivation for re-evaluating our conclusions
about CVM's performance suggests that: "the motivation for this paper
derives from the apparent lack of information made available to the
Ohio Court for its assessment of this critically important aspect of damage estimates obtained by applications of the CVM... It is our view
that the three studies considered by the court in this regard do not constitute the state of the art of our understanding of the relationship between CVM values and values that reflect real economic commitments."5
While the ruling specifically identifies three studies, it also cites
the DOI 301 Project review of "Techniques to Measure Damages to Natural Resources." One of the three cited was a review article by Cross59
with fairly detailed summaries of CVM research. The DOI report specif57. The complexity of the valuation task is not avoided by drawing analogies to what
would happen if there were markets for the resource's services. There is no reason to
believe the services are perceived as available in readily divisible and separable units.
These perceptions must be considered in defining the methods used to respond to injuries
to natural resources and any proposed (for the purposes of CVM analysis) means of
payment for these activities. See Valuing Natural Assets: The Economics of Natural
Resource Damage Assessment (R. Kopp & V. Smith eds., 1993) for discussion of these

issues.
58. Cummings & Harrison, supra note 14, at 3.
59. F. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 269 (1989).
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ically evaluated the implications of 23 contingent valuation studies for
valuing CERCLA-related resource services. Moreover, the Ohio court's
ruling also noted that the same Department of Interior Technical Information Document included an annotated bibliography with "...
323 articles and studies related to natural resource assessments, including
60
many treatises addressing CV [contingent valuation] methodology."
Indeed, the Desvousges and Kahen component of the DOI report provides a summary of the needs, assumptions, and limitations
of contingent valuation that emphasized a format that is inconsistent
with the Exxon sponsored studies. They highlighted the need for inperson interviews, the importance of taking steps to ensure the commodity presented to respondents is "consistent with economic principles
yet credible to respondents," and the need for careful statistical analysis of CVM results.6 ' Thus, the issue is not, as CH imply, whether the
court was ill-informed, but rather whether there is sufficient new information to warrant a change in their evaluation of CVM. Here my
evaluation of the new research is different from theirs.
The only new study with a commodity that resembles a situation where CVM is applied in a context that is similar to that relevant
to damage assessment is the recent Duffield-Patterson study.62 Ignoring the nonrespondents in both the hypothetical and actual donations,
these authors found, as CH report, that CVM estimates are 35 percent
larger than average cash contributions. However, Duffield and Patterson also found that there is no significant difference in the means
or the frequency distributions between CVM and actual donations
when the analysis focuses on respondents. Differences between CVM
and actual donations arise when different analysts make different assumptions about the values to impute to nonrespondents. Developing
a framework that consistently deals with these nonresponses is among
the challenges facing research designed to evaluate the conditions when
CVM accurately measures "genuine economic values."
CH's penetrating review of the experimental literature suggests that it is important to consider how the findings of these experiments are being used. The existing literature tells us little about the
importance of strategic behavior for CVM surveys for several reasons.
First, as they note, the institutional context for experiments and CVM
surveys is very different. Equally important, the commodities involved,
opportunities to engage in repeated decisions, specified technologies
for delivering the public goods (along with implicit divisibility of their
60. 880 F.2d at 95.
61. W. Desvousges & V. Kahen, Measuring Natural Resource Damages: An Economic
Perspective (Sept. 1985) (prepared for the CERCLA 301 Task Force, U.S. Dept. of the
Interior, Research Triangle Institute).
62. See Plott, supra note 39 at 1.
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public goods), and the incentives themselves are quite different from
the primary focus of CVM surveys.
CH's review clearly identified that Mitchell and Carson's conclusions about free-riding should not have been interpreted as a dismissal of free-riding in all circumstances. The overall literature on
free-riding (including the more recent experiments) offers a mixed
record of findings about when it can be important. What remains unanswered is whether it is possible to test (in an experimental setting) the
approaches used in CVM surveys to attempt to control strategic behavior.
Controlled experiments linking CVM and actual sales are an
important extension to the simulated market approach introduced by
Bishop and Heberlein. However, to offer an effective basis for evaluating the correspondence between preferences estimated based on CVM
in comparison to actual sales of commodities, they will require greater
attention to demand modeling, taking account of the differences in people's characteristics and constraints. Blackburn, Harrison and Rutstrom
recent attempts to estimate the bias in hypothetical purchase intention
questions in comparison with actual choices is an attempt to develop
an empirical model of how people may make mistakes in responding
63
to hypothetical questions.
The NOAA Panel report was published on January 15, 1993. It
clearly accepts CVM studies as capable of producing: ". . . estimates
reliable enough to be the starting point of a judicial process of damage
assessment, including lost passive-use [nonusel values." The report expands upon this evaluation, qualifying how it is to be interpreted by
noting that:
The phrase 'be the starting point' is meant to emphasize that
the panel does not suggest that CV estimates can be taken
as automatically defining the range of compensable damages
within narrow limits .... The Panel is persuaded that hypothetical markets tend to overstate willingness to pay for
private as well as public goods. The same bias must be expected to occur in CV studies. To the extent that the design
of CV instruments makes conservative choices when alternatives are available.., this intrinsic basis may be offset or
even over-corrected .... The judicial process must in each
case come to a conclusion about the degree to which respondents have been induced to consider alternative uses of
funds and take the proposed vehicle seriously .... The
Panel's conclusion is that a well-conducted CV study provides an adequately reliable benchmark to begin such ar63. Blackburn et al., supra note 43.
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guments. It contains information that judges and juries will
evidence, including
wish to use, in combination with other
64
the testimony of expert witnesses.
The panel's report suggests fairly broad guidelines for evaluating whether a CV study has been "well conducted," but in commenting
on the issue of reliability of CV estimates, the report clearly places the
burden of proof with survey designers.
The proposed guidelines seem to represent a formidable "barrier-to-entry" for CVM research used in damage assessments.65 Nonetheless, caution and use of the best practice methods based on today's
information, would seem to be prudent. Our prospects for success will
be influenced by clear communication with respondents, analyst understanding of what are the important (but often non-economic) dimensions of the problem context from respondents' perspectives,
respondents' knowledge and willingness to deal with the proposed
choices seriously, and the details of survey implementation and data
analysis.
Their guidelines for designing a CVM study offer a good start
for a general CVM protocol. Some aspects of their recommendations
will likely be regarded by CVM practitioners as unnecessary. However,
it may be difficult to offer clear-cut evidence (as opposed to expert
judgment) to support their objections. Likewise, the CVM critics may
also find fault with Panel recommendations that are rendered as if they
were based on extensive experiments. The evidence cited to support
the specifics of their guidelines is sparse.
Several aspects of their report were disappointing and seem
likely to cause problems. First, the Panel's report suggests that adherence to the Guidelines will increase the reliability of CVM estimates,
but they do little to identify which elements are most important.66 Second, the Panel's report provides no discussion of their views about the
limitations (or lack of them) in the other methods available for measuring people's demands for nonmarketed resources in comparison with
CVM. While it is true that these approaches cannot estimate passive
use values, when use value offers the major source of losses from in64. Report of NOAA Panel on Contingent Valuation, 58 Fed. Reg. 4610-11 (1993)
(emphasis added). The NOAA panel included (in the order listed on their report): K.
Arrow, R,Solow, P. Portney, E. Learner, R. Radner and H. Schuman.
65. The report does appear to offer some leeway in CVM surveys designed for pure
research by acknowledging opportunities to economize on survey costs or to combine
multiple research objectives.
66. Their comments on the contribution of their proposed Guidelines to reliability
provide very few hints as to how they feel it will be affected by departures from their
recommendations. The most one can find is a statement that: "A CV survey does not
have to meet each of these guidelines fully in order to qualify as a source of reliable
information to a damage assessment process. Many departures from the guidelines or
even a single serious deviation would, however, suggest unreliability prima facie." 58

Fed. Reg. 4601, 4608 (1993).
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juries, a choice of methods will need to be made and some appraisal
of the relative performance of CVM versus indirect methods would be
exceptionally helpful.
Finally, the Panel treats the extent of the market (including both
the geographic and commodity dimensions) as a legal issue. This approach is misleading. Within the "legally defined group" distinguishing who would demand restoration for injured services encompasses
the issues of substitution and embedding. It is therefore not simply a
procedural matter.
There can be no ultimate resolution to questions that require
we learn how people are affected by activities that cannot be subjected
to private individualized controls and choice. Understanding how they
feel about such issues will continue to be difficult unless we trust what
they tell us. This does not mean we uncritically accept CVM. Rather it
suggests that interviews to learn stated preferences like the various types
of choices we can observe, represent forms of social interaction. Until
they are adequately incorporated into our models of people's behavior, there will remain skepticism about using CVM for valuation information. The NOAA Panel's report has taken a first step at charting
a course of research and "best practice" methods for litigation to begin
that process. At this stage in the accumulated research record, there is
nothing in the CVM results to date that suggests the method provides
estimates of per household willingness to pay that would be less reliable than those available using the indirect methods. Each approach
must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
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Table 1.Smith-Osborne Meta Analyses of Contingent Valuation Estimates of WTP for Visibility Chanseso

Indepdendent Variables

mean
Values

Intereep

I

I

Models'
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-1.098
(0.75)

.36
(5.26)

1.367
(4.39)

1.368
(6.66)

1.521
(4.23)

.688
(2.53)

.639
(50.81)

1.120
(2.32)

.684
(53.95)

1.130
(2.42)

-516
(08.42)

.822
(-2353)

.277
(7,34)

.108
(1.14)

Percent change in visibility

. 700b

Esstpercet change in visibility

.155

Interative bidding (1)

.052

.195
(1.81)

Direct question (Wl)

.086

-4.650
(-10.85)

Direction of change (1)

.302

1.335
(132)

.341
(1.14)

.402
(1.38)

327
0.38)

.395
(1.74)

Asked region (01)

.65

1.626
(0.57)

-.404
(-1,39)

.451
(-46)

-.460
(-1.86)

-.462
(1.86)

Park interview (W1)

.095

-.694
(-9.07)

-.673
(-9.20)

-.912
(-7.06)

Question framed for visibility change
at revisit to sate (-)

.172

-1.017
(-1.8)

-.728
(-278)

-1,304
(-2,95)

Entrance fee

.198

.289
(5.36)

Residents in sample

.707

-.200
(-123)

d

-356
(-2.09)

1.665
(1.48)

-.915
(-I.97)

-4.613
(-14.25)

n

115

88

97

106

115

R

.337

.362

.729

.450

.728

*Nbmse a par~llm as ease d iwlleflan iS Whalecaeoaeaum
.enaw, eelliaue
*ThiWesale is
byaiad
INLw owe ewasiates esoi i the ppoueus ckeap is a

uke of vWt1Y is

ale

me

. lbe d

* lb
Th leisChvesloesas 119901model apegcgedmwurm
alwes
WT?per vmi wper doyh 1"s dollan w 02in 1nvhedfl1AtW sIblyl.
-. 7 E "a lmsd/llud tbumtyi, witkRI . .71
(-54)
' Venmeaebuswuls la ,,ai~lla cimu5 . as wmm als
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Table 2: Cummings - Harrison - Rutstr6m Calculator Experiments:
Logit Modelsa
n=6

Independent
Variablesb

(1)

(2)

(3)

Intercept

2.65
(0.57)

.76
(0.18)

2.65
(0.65)

Price

.08
(0.09)

.08
(0.10)

-.28
(-0.34)

Actual sale = 1

3.78
(1.52)
.70
(1.47)

Actual sale* price
R2

.002

.44

.42

* The data for this correspond to the ratio of no responses to total respondents in each
of the seven samples described in Cummings, Harrison, and Rutstr6m (CH and R) J1992).
Samples 1 through 6 received the same basic instructions with I to 3 the hypothetical
sales and 4 to 6 the actual sales. These are ordinary least squares based on a log odds

model.

bThe numbers in parentheses are the ratios of the estimated coefficient to its estimated
asymptotic standard error for the null hypothesis of no association.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 34

Table 3: Micro Analysis of the CH and R Calculator Sales Experimenta
Independent
Variables

Full Sample

Hypothetical
Treatment

Actual Sale
Treatment

Intercept

1.132
(3.30)

1.335
(3.37)

1.369
(2.00)

Price

.061
(0.81)

.066 X 103
(0.00)

.269
(1.53)

Actual Sale = 1
(Otherwise = 0)

.807
(3.03)

Don't Own
Calculator = 1
(Otherwise = 0)

-1.582
(-6.53)

-1.475
(-.5.23)

-1.992
(-3.83)

n

241

124

117

pseudo R2

.31

.22

.38

The dependent variable is discrete with I = no and 0 = yes. Estimates were computed
using Probit and the number in parentheses under each estimated coefficient is the ratio
of the coefficient to its estimated asymptotic standard error.

